NOTE
FROM THE UNITED STATES TO EUROPE:
A COMPARATIVE STUDY OF
PRODUCTION JOINT
VENTURES
I.

INTRODUCTION

For over a century the United States has championed antitrust legislation as a cornerstone of its free market economy. In the last decade,
however, lawmakers have called for a reappraisal of established antitrust
regulations. While global markets are expanding, strict antitrust legislation in the United States, in spite of its domestic benefits, is dulling industrial competitiveness.' At the same time, Japan, an integrated Europe,
and other rapidly industrializing countries are exerting tremendous influence in the international trade arena. Many of these countries are realizing that antitrust policy cannot be ignored and are rapidly developing
their own body of competition law. 2 The European Community (EC) in
particular is legislating with a sense of urgency in order to facilitate the
formation of the common market and prevent abuse of its integrated
economy.

3

With the growth of a global economy and the increase in the use of
tariffs, quotas, and duties, a focus on the development of international
joint ventures is becoming increasingly relevant. 4 This focus has been
turning toward production joint ventures, a collaborative arrangement
that offers tremendous potential for growth and economic benefit. 5 The
United States recently has seen a number of production joint ventures
1. See infra note 14 and accompanying text.
2. See Fair Trade Commission Issues Rules on Enforcement of Japan'sAnti-Monopoly Law, 8 Int'l
Trade Rep. (BNA) No. 29, at 1077 (july 17, 1991) (discussing new antitrust guidelines); Canadian
Antitrust; Beware of the Poodle, THE ECONOMIST, Apr. 7, 1984, at 70.
3. See infra part Ill.B.4. for a discussion of recent production joint venture legislation in the EC.
See generally Vivienne Robinson, Recent Developments in the Law of the European Community, 2 DuKE J.
COMP. & hrr'L L 1 (1992) (discussing recent developments in EC competition policy).
4. Joint ventures are formed by two or more entities or individuals in order to share mutually
beneficial resources. See Joseph F. Brodley, Joint Ventures & Antitrust Policy, 95 HARv. L REv. 1523,
1524-27 (1982).
5. H.R. REP. No. 516, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. 13 (1990). See also Alvin F. Lindsay III, Tuning in to
HDTV: Can ProductionJoint Ventures Improve America's High-Tech Picture?, 44 U. MIAMI L. REv. 1159,
1168 (1990).
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between corporate giants seeking to increase their competitive edge in the.
international markets. 6 In spite of the benefits that joint ventures offer,
the law of the United States, as it stands today, is riddled with uncertainties that discourage potential collaboration. 7 Legislators are beginning to
recognize that well defined legal standards are required in order to encourage the formation of production joint ventures. 8 EC competition
policy, on the other hand, traditionally has been guided by clearer legislation and a more coherent body of case law; this has facilitated the development of joint ventures. 9
The first part of this paper discusses the definition of a joint venture,
the current state of antitrust laws applicable to joint ventures in the
United States, and the rule of reason analysis. The second part examines
existing laws applicable to production joint ventures in the EC and identifies the differences between the two systems. Finally, a controversial production joint venture is analyzed according to EC legal principles in order
to compare the operation of the two systems.
II.

THE HISTORY OF PRODUCTION JOINT VENTURES IN THE
UNITED STATES

Free competition is the driving force of the economy in the United
States. The Sherman Antitrust Act (Sherman Act) codifies the legal principles that guide this free market economy. 10 This Act is sometimes referred to as the "Magna Carta of free enterprise" and its importance is
equated to the Bill of Rights' protection of fundamental freedoms."I It
remains the cornerstone of United States competition law although it was
enacted over one hundred years ago.
The Sherman Act, however, has not evolved adequately to deal with
the dynamics of an emerging global marketplace. 12 To the drafters of the
Sherman Act, " '[t]he Trusts' were real political dragons to be slain...
6. The most recent of these is the intended joint venture between Apple and IBM. See Louise
Kehoe, Appe, IBM Plan Rapid Development, FIN. TimEs, Oct. 2, 1991, at 23.
7. See infra part II.B.1.
part II.C.
8. See infra
9. See infra part III.
10. 15 U.S.C. S 1 et. seq. (1988). The Sherman Act
rests on the premise that the unrestrained interaction of competitive forces will yield the
best allocation of our economic resources, the lowest prices, the highest quality and the
greatest material progress, while at the same time providing an environment conducive to
the preservation of our democratic political and social institutions.
Northern Pac. Ry. Co. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 4 (1958).
1l. United States v. Topco Associates, 405 U.S. 596, 610 (1972).
12. Drafted with a regulatory focus limited to the domestic U.S. economy, the Sherman Act is
infringing upon the ability of United States companies to compete in the global market. Former U.S.
Attorney General Richard Thornburgh recently wrote that "[the purpose of antitrust laws is to
promote healthy competition in the U.S., not to protect competitors... sometimes the antitrust laws
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with a few dramatic but vague and novel tools .... 13 Today's dragon is
fierce foreign competition which threatens domestic companies that were
previously dominant in the national and international markets.1 4 As one
congressional leader stated:
American firms are no longer merely competing among themselves.
They must compete in an international marketplace. Many high tech
companies must compete especially against Japanese enterprises that
have the support of the Japanese government, Japanese banks and Japanese labor all acting in concert. The odds are thus stacked against
American business. This changing reality ought to prompt a revision of
policies that hamper our ability to compete. 15
Contributing to the difficulties faced by United States firms is the
inconsistent judicial treatment of the Sherman Act. The Sherman Act
accords the courts considerable leeway in interpreting its statutory provisions; the body of case law that has subsequently developed is extremely
ambiguous and similar fact situations have led to different results. 16 This
lack of uniformity coupled with the severe penalty of treble damages discourages collaboration.1 7 Congress, during the past decade, has responded to this problem by enacting legislation that encourages the
formation of joint ventures by limiting antitrust enforcement for joint
ventures in the fields of research and development and production for
exportation.1 8
With the growing popularity due to the undeniable benefits of pro-

duction joint ventures, there is a demand for similar legislation in this
field. 19 The Committee on the Judiciary's report on H.R. 461120 identifies a number of economic realities that make new legislation imperative:
first, the costs involved in developing new technology and bringing it into
the market place may be beyond the ability of single firms; second, the
economics behind high tech manufacturing requires short life cycles for
must be modified to remain true to their goal." Richard L Thornburgh, U.S. Firms Get Tripped in
Race to the Marketplace, WALL ST. J., Dec. 27, 1988, at A10.
13. Donald I. Baker, Restating and Refining Remedies: The Trading Company Act, The JointResearch
Act and The Local Government Antitrust Act, 55 ANrrrusT L.J.
499, 499 (1986).
14. The market for high technology is a prime example of the fierce competition facing U.S.
industry. Only a decade ago, the U.S., with 5% of the world's population, was generating about 75%
of the world's technology. Today the U.S. generates about 50%, and unless there are fundamental
changes in technological policies, this figure is estimated to reach 30% in the next decade. H.R.
CONF. REP. No. 571, 98th Cong., IstSess., pt. 1, at 8 (1983).
15. The National Productivity and Innovation Act and Related Legislation: Hearings on S.1841 Before
the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. 44 (1983) (statement of Senator Paul Tsongas).
16. See discussion infra part II.B.1.
17. See infra note 72 and accompanying text.
18. See infra part II.C.
19. Beginning early in the 101st Congress much legislation was introduced that took a variety of
approaches to stimulating more cooperative activity by U.S. firms. See infra part ll.C.
20. H.R. CONF. RE. No. 516, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. (1990). See also infra part II.C.3.

166

DUKE JOURNAL OF COMPARATIVE & INTERNATIONAL LAW

[Vol. 2:163

products and the need for rapid response time to meet consumer demands for variety and customized items; third, competing products may
now provide a technology innovator no more than six to twelve months
of exclusivity.2 1 For this reason, firms in the United States need to de-

velop and execute production strategies and scheduling with greater
22
dispatch.
A. Joint Ventures
The term joint venture is difficult to define. Much of this difficulty
stems from the use of the term to describe many different types of interfirm contractual arrangements.2 3 The Supreme Court has commented
that "[plerhaps every agreement and combination to restrain trade could
be ... labeled [a joint venturel." 2 4 Nonetheless, certain elements, when

combined, distinguish a joint venture from a cartel, merger, or other
combination:
1. The enterprise is under the joint control of unrelated parent
firms;
12. Each parent firm makes a substantial contribution (in terms
of
expertise or resources or any combination thereof) to the joint enterprise;
3. The enterprise exists as a separate business entity from its parent
firms; and
4. The joint venture creates offspring "capability in terms of new
productive capacity, new technology, a new product, or entry into a new
25
market."
Production joint ventures specifically are designed to facilitate collaboration in the production of goods.2 6 Despite the fact that courts generally perceive joint ventures as providing a public benefit,2 7 merely
21. H.R. CoNF.REP. No. 516 at 1.
22. Id. at 1-2; Thornburgh, supra note 12, at Al0.
23. Brodley, supra note 4, at 1524.
24. Timken Roller Bearing Co. v. United States, 341 U.S. 593, 598 (1951).
25. Brodley, supra note 4, at 1525-26. See also Lewis Bernstein, Joint Ventures in the Light of Recent
Antitrust Developments: Anti-Competitive Joint Ventures, 10 ANT'RrusT Butt. 25, 25 (1965) (explaining
that in a merger, two or more companies combine all of their assets to create a new entity but that the
creation of a joint venture does not extinguish either of the venture partners).
26. This is true irrespective of whether the venture is also concerned with research and develop-

ment or other activities. CHRISTOPHER Bm.itY & GRaAm D. CHILD, COMMON MARKET LAW OF
COMPETIION S 5-064 (3d ed. 1987).
27. Judge Taft noted that the public derives an advantage when partners adopt restrictions to
secure "the union of their capital, enterprise, and energy to carry on a successful business." United
States v. Addyston Pipe & Steel Co., 85 F. 271, 280 (6th Cir. 1898), aff'd, 175 U.S. 211 (1899).
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labelling a production arrangement a joint venture will not shield it from
28
antitrust regulation.
B. Antitrust Law
Joint ventures are evaluated primarily under § 1 of the Sherman
Act 29 - the linchpin of antitrust regulation. 30 Section 1 states that
"[e]very contract, combination in the form of a trust or otherwise, or
conspiracy in restraint of trade or commerce among the several states or
foreign nations is declared to be illegal." 31 Because a joint venture constitutes a partial combination, the crucial analysis is whether the venture is
32
"in restraint of trade."
The Sherman Act places a heavy burden on the judiciary to define
an antitrust violation. 33 The courts have responded by developing the
rule of reason analysis. 34 Although courts differ in their interpretation of
this principle, 35 under the rule of reason it is acknowledged that all business arrangements impose some restraints on free trade, but only those
arrangements that unreasonably restrain trade should fall within the coverage of the Sherman Act. 36 The essential test for the legality of a busi37
ness practice is whether it suppresses or promotes overall competition.
Thus, when the anticompetitive effects of a business combination are outweighed by the ensuing procompetitive results, the combination is considered to be a reasonable restraint of trade.
28. The courts have been circumspect in readily approving all combinations labelled as joint

ventures. See Tirnken, 341 U.S. at 593.
29. 15 U.S.C. 5 1 (1988).
30. THOMAS V. VAXEmcs, ANTRrusT BAsICS S 10.01 (1990). Joint ventures are subject to additional review and challenge under 15 U.S.C. S 2 (1988) (Sherman Act); 15 U.S.C. S 7 (1988) (the
Clayton Act applies to joint ventures involving the acquisition of assets); 15 U.S.C.

SS 41-58 (1988)

(FTC Act).
31. 15 U.S.C. S 1 (1988).
32. Id.

33. Senator Sherman stated in an address to Congress:
[lt isdifficult to define in legal language the precise line between lawful and unlawful combinations. This must be left to the courts to determine in each particular case. All that we, as
lawmakers, can do is to declare general principles, and we can be assured that the courts will
apply them as to carry out the meaning of the law .... This bill is only an honest effort to
declare a rule of action.
21 CONG. REc. 2455, 2460 (1890), reprinted in 1 LEoISLAnVE HISTORY OF THE FEDERAL A~n'musr LAws
AND RELATED STATUTES 51, 122 (Earl W. Kintner ed., 1978).

34. See Bunker Ramo Corp. v. United Business Forms, Inc., 713 F.2d 1272 (7th Cir. 1983). The
application of the "rule of reason" is triggered only after the plaintiff has met the initial burden of
proving that the challenged conduct restrains competition. Los Angeles Memorial Coliseum
Comm'n v. National Football League, 726 F.2d 1381, 1391 (9th Cir. 1984), cert denied, 469 U.S. 990
(1984).
35. Brodley, supra note 4, at 1523-24.
36. See, eg., National Soc'y of Professional Eng'rs v. United States, 435 U.S. 679 (1978).
37. Id.
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The rule of reason requires a thorough investigation of the particular
industry under review and a balancing of positive and negative effects of
the agreement on competition? 8 Courts, however, refuse to look into
agreements that plainly are anticompetitive, classifying them as per se illegal. 39 Although there has been some debate as to whether the per se rule
is distinct from the rule of reason, the majority view is that the two are
40
essentially the same analysis.
The broad judicial discretion allowed under the Sherman Act has
resulted in conflicting interpretations of the role of antitrust law. One
commentator has noted that the conflicting application of antitrust laws
has created a split personality within the judiciary, leading to conflicting
decisions based on similar facts. 4 1 Beyond interpreting statutory language, the courts have used economic analysis 42 and have adopted a legislative posture43 in defining the parameters of antitrust enforcement.
Courts have added to the ambiguity in the field by analyzing cases in
44
terms of all three of these elements.
1. The Rule of Reason Dissected. In applying the rule of reason, four
principal areas of inquiry can be identified: 45 the purpose of the arrangement, the existence of and need for market power in connection with the
joint venture; whether there is a less restrictive alternative available, and
the procompetitive or anticompetitive effects of the arrangement. 46 The
38. Bunker Ramo, 713 F.2d at 1283.
39. See, e.g., United States v. Topco Assocs., Inc., 405 U.S. 596, 607-08 (1972).
40. See William J.Sims, NCAA v. Board of Regents and a Truncated Rule of Reason: Retaining
Flexibility Without Sacrcing Efficiency, 27 Aiz. L REv. 193 (1985).
41. Thomas C. Arthur, Farewell to the Sea of Doubt: Jettisoning the ConstitutionalSherman Act, 74
CAL. L REv. 263, 309-10 (1986). Arthur strongly suggests that the courts have wrongly interpreted
judicial discretion to mean a "standardless delegation." Arthur argues that in actuality, the delegation to them was similar to "the power that every statute delegates to courts." Id. at 290.
42. The Supreme Court apparently misapplied economic theories regarding oligopoly and held
that the mere exchange of price information which was freely available in other markets unduly
affected prices in the corrugated container industry in the Southeast. United States v. Container
Corp. of America, 393 U.S. 333 (1969).
43. The most forthright statement of this role came from Judge Learned Hand in United States v.
Associated Press:
[T]he injury imposed upon the public was found to outweigh the benefit to the combination, and the law forbade it. We can find no more definite guide than that. Certainly such
a function is ordinarily 'legislative' ... [b]ut it is a mistake to suppose that courts are never
called upon to make similar choices.
United States v. Associated Press, 52 F. Supp. 362, 370 (S.D.N.Y. 1943), aff'd, 326 U.S. 1 (1945).
44. See, e.g., Jefferson Parish Hospital Dist. No. 2 v. Hyde, 466 U.S. 2 (1984).
45. See CLARK C. HAvIrHuRsT, HEALTH CARE LAW AND PoLIcy: READINGS, NOTES AND QuEsTIONS 325-26 (1988).
46. Id. See generally 7 PHILLIP E. AREEDA, ANTITusT LAW 55 1500-11 (1986) [hereinafter ANTITRusT LAw]; PHILLIP E. AREEDA, THE "RuLE OF REASON" INAN-rrmrsT ANALYSIS: GENERAL IssuEs 2.13

(1981).
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main purpose of competition law should be kept in mind when undertak47
ing this analysis - the laws protect competition, not the competitor.
First, a court will inquire into the purpose of the arrangement in
question. A court seeks to ascertain whether the arrangement is a naked
restraint on competition or whether the restraints it imposes are merely
ancillary to an overriding legitimate competitive purpose. 48 Generally,
naked restraints are illegal under the per se rule.49 Potential social benefits will not justify a restraint which suppresses competition. 50 Some naked restraints, however, may be permitted under the de minimis rule when
the restraint affects only the nonprice dimensions of competition or
51
merely seeks to address a market's failure to be perfectly competitive.
Even where the main purpose of an arrangement is procompetitive, a
court may find that an ancillary restraint of trade is illegal because it is not
imperative to the success of the arrangement. 52 Thus, the essential test is
whether the challenged restraints are reasonably necessary to the success
of a venture. 53 If the ancillary restraints are reasonably necessary, then
54
they are generally permitted.
The second area of judicial inquiry assesses the existence of market
power. Market power refers to the ability of a firm to raise prices in a
47. Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 320 (1962).
48. 7 AiNmusr LAw, supra note 46, 31501 (quoting United States v. Addyston Pipe & Steel
Co., 85 F. 271 (6th Cir. 1898)).
49. Id.
50. National Socy of Professional Eng'rs v. United States, 435 U.S. 679, 696 (1978) (allowing a
worthy purpose defense for a naked restraint would be to set sail on a "sea of doubt").
51.

See HAviGHURST, supra note 45, at 326.

52. But see Continental T.V. Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc., 433 U.S. 36 (1977) (warning that second
guessing business decisions in organizing joint ventures may expose the venture partners to high
damages and reduce enthusiasm for collaborative activity).
53. See United States v. Timken Roller Bearing Co., 83 F. Supp. 284, 313 (N.D. Ohio, 1949),
modified, 341 U.S. 593 (1951). The district court stated:
If a joint venture or partnership is formed for the purpose of a lawful business enterprise
and restraints result from the right to protect established business interests no violation of
the law occurs. But if the association is formed for the purpose of continuing a combination
to allocate exclusive sales territories in the world, to fix prices and to eliminate competition
both within and without the combination, it cannot hide from the effects of the law under
the cloak of a joint venture or a partnership.
Id. at 312. See also Yamaha Motor Co. v. FTC, 657 F.2d 971 (8th Cir. 1982) (striking down a joint
venture which restricted Yamaha from competing in nonjoint venture products since the restriction
was not reasonably necessary to the success of the joint venture); Daniel M. Crane, Joint Research and
Development Ventures and the Antitrust Laws, 21 HARv. J. ON LEGIs. 405, 414 (1984).
54. But see United States v. Pan Am. World Airways, 193 F. Supp. 18 (S.D.N.Y. 1961), rev'd on
other grounds, 371 U.S. 296 (1963). An airline company and a steamship line joined together to form a
new airline. The initial agreement which prevented the parents from competing with the venture in
its market was valid as reasonably necessary for the success of the joint venture. Id. However, once
the venture was fully capable of competing with itself, the restraint was struck down because it was no
longer ancillary. See id at 34, 37-38 & n.17. See also United States v. E.I. DuPont De NeMours &
Co., 118 F. Supp. 41, 218-22 (D. Del. 1953), aff'd, 351 U.S. 377 (1956).

170

DUKE JOURNAL OF COMPARATIVE & INTERNATIONAL LAW

[Vol. 2:163

defined market above the competitive level without becoming unprofitable.55 The possession of market power is considered a prerequisite to a
violation of the Sherman Act. 56 In order to ascertain whether a party has
market power, a court must first define the relevant market in which to
compute the party's market share.57 This involves identifying a geographic area and a set of products or services that together constitute a
distinct competitive arena. 5 8 The court must then compute the party's
market share, consider entry barriers, and decide whether the company's
share is large enough to support the contention that market power actually exists. 59
Third, the court will ascertain whether the legitimate purpose of the
agreement can be achieved through means less harmful to competition.
This is a highly speculative area of inquiry and results in second guessing
business decisions by the judiciary - an inquiry which they are not in the
best position to undertake. A word of caution was sounded in Continental
T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc.,60 a case in which the Supreme Court
stated that antitrust laws do not exist to organize business in specific ways.
The Court noted: "We are unable to perceive significant social gain from
channeling transactions into one form or another." 6 1 By second guessing
alternatives to joint ventures, the courts also expose the participants to
substantial damage awards, thus frustrating their incentive to collaborate.
Finally, a court will balance the positive and negative effects of a
business combination on the free economy. This last evaluation is necessary for a court to determine "whether or not the challenged restraint
enhances competition." 62 Courts have yet to define, however, the precise
manner in which this analysis should be undertaken. 63 The NCAA
Court implied that a balancing test should be used, but it failed to explain
how to assign relative weights to the two effects. 64 This lack of guidance
has led to divergent decisions based on similar facts as demonstrated by
the holdings in Topco 6 5 and Broadcast Music. 66 In Topco, the Court
55. William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, Market Power in Antitrust Cases, 94 HARv. L. REv.
937, 937 (1981).
56. Market power must also be established in order to bring an action for a violation of S 2 of
the Sherman Act and S 7 of the Clayton Act. See generally United States v. Aluminum Co. of
America, 148 F.2d 416 (2d Cir. 1945); Appalachian Coal v. United States, 288 U.S. 344 (1933);
Chicago Board of Trade . United States, 246 U.S. 231 (1918).
57. See generally Landes & Posner, supra note 55.
58. Id.
59. Id.
60. Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc., 433 U.S. 36 (1977).
61. Id. at 58 n.29.
62. NCAA v. Board of Regents of the Univ. of Okla., 468 U.S. 85, 104 (1984).
63. See Arthur, supra note 41, at 361.
64. See NCAA, 468 U.S. at 117-20.
65. United States v. Topco Assocs., Inc., 405 U.S. 596 (1982).
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found that the allocation of markets, although necessary to the success of
the venture, was a naked restraint constituting a per se antitrust violation.67 Although market power is generally an essential consideration of
a court under the rule of reason analysis, the Topco Court ignored this
area of inquiry when making its determination. 68 On the other hand, in
Broadcast Music, the Court upheld certain restrictions as procompetitive
ancillary restraints although the two companies involved dominated the
69
market.
The growing popularity of joint ventures, in the face of this inconsistent judicial treatment, suggests a strong need for legislative action. Private suits and potential punitive damages further discourage production
activity. These concerns were raised in Congressional hearings on H.R.
5041 by Joseph Crieghton, General Counsel and Vice President of Harris
Corp.:
Management continually asks me why we lawyers cannot provide a clear
answer. They point out that they must make decisions.... [A]lthough
there are 9 chances out of 10 of winning a law suit, if the one chance
company
occurs and the law suit is lost, the disastrous effect upon the
70
will be exactly the same as if the odds had been reversed.
2. The Treble Damage Threat. A second major disincentive to the
growth of production joint ventures in the United States is the availability
of treble damage awards to plaintiffs in civil suits. Many economists and
politicians have suggested reasons to eliminate treble damage remedies. 7 '
[Elven with a rational and sympathetic government policy, the fear of a
private antitrust suit seeking treble damages, as well as attorneys' fees, is
surely enough to inhibit any worthwhile ventures. The U.S. economy
can ill afford the burden of such fear. Congress should consider
antitrust uncertainty with reamending the antitrust laws to eliminate
72
spect to joint production ventures.
There are, however, important reasons for permitting such recovery.
Treble damages are meant to encourage the private enforcement of the
66. Broadcast Music v. Columbia Broadcasting System, 441 U.S. 1 (1979) (ASCAP & BMI
issued blanket licenses to copyrighted musical compositions at negotiated fees).
67. Topco Assocs., 405 U.S. at 608. The Supreme Court invoked the per se rule against a group
of small grocers who had formed a joint venture to promote a commonly launched brand. Although
the venture had a very small share of the relevant market, it designated an exclusive territory to each
participant and thus constituted a naked restraint. Id.
68. See Topco Assocs., 405 U.S. at 607-08.
69. Broadcast Music, 441 U.S. at 7. •
70. The National Productivity and Innovation Acts and Related Legislation: Hearings Before the Senate
Committee on the Judiciary, 98th Cong., 2nd Sess. 320 (1984).
71. J. Thomas Rosch, Introductory Remarks, in A Reassessment of Antitrust Remedies, 55 AnTRUST L.J. 53, 54-56 (1986).
72. Thornburgh, supra note 12, at A10.
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73
Sherman Act by providing an incentive to sue and the means to do so.
The question that deserves consideration is whether strict and widespread
scrutiny of joint ventures is desirable in light of the tremendous growth
potential that such arrangements offer. Without the incentive to sue afforded by treble damages, the number of meritless suits would be reduced.
Additionally, challenges would be brought mainly by the Department of
Justice (DOJ) and the Federal Trade Commission (FTC),74 thereby enabling them to play a more direct and substantial role in the development
of the law; uncertainty in the area of joint ventures would be reduced.

C. New Legislative Directions
Realizing the need for clarification and change, Congress amended
the antitrust laws applicable to collaborative conduct in the key areas of
research and development and product exportation. 75 This legislation
has laid the foundation for several bills, recently introduced by Congress,
76
which would facilitate the development of production joint ventures. It
is a distinct possibility that, with the enactment of the research and development and product export legislation, the proposed legislation for production joint ventures also will be passed. 7 7 Thus, an understanding of
the principles of the research and development and production export
legislation is critical to an understanding of the potential direction that
production joint venture legislation might take.
1. The Export TradingCompany Act of 1982 (ETCA). The ETCA 78
was enacted in response to complaints that exports of the United States
were hampered by domestic antitrust laws. The ETCA establishes a system of certification for exporting associations (including those associations not solely involved in export). Certificates are issued jointly by the
Department of Commerce and the DOJ to those applicants who meet
certain standards. 79 This eliminates the threat of litigation, both govern73. Rosch, supra note 71, at 54.
74. Id. at 56.
75. See infra part 11.C.
76. Lindsay, supra note 5, at 1160, (citing Andrew Pollack, The Setback for Advanced TV Mosbacher, in Shi, Wants Wider Policy, N.Y. TimEs, Sept. 30, 1980, at YI).
77. See infra part 1l.C.3.
78. 15 U.S.C SS 4001-4003, 4011-4021, 4051-4053 (1988 & Supp. 1991).
79. 15 U.S.C. S 4013 (1988 & Supp. 1991). The Act provides, in part:
A certificate of review shall be issued to any applicant that establishes that its specified
export trade, export trade activities, and methods of operation will (1) result in neither a substantial lessening of competition or restraint of trade within the
United States nor a substantial restraint of the exportation of any competitor of the
applicant,
(2) not unreasonably enhance, stabilize, or depress prices within the United States of the
goods, wares, merchandise, or services of the class exported by the applicant,
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mental and private, arising from participation in certain specified
activities.8 0
2. National Cooperative Research Act of 1984 (NCRA). The
NCRA8 1 was enacted in order to promote research and development
through joint ventures. The NCRA declares that joint research and development ventures are not per se illegal, and instructs courts that this
type of joint venture should be considered under a reasonableness test,
82
which takes into account all relevant factors affecting competition.
Under the NCRA, both the DOJ and the FTC are notified of the details
of the joint venture. 83 After notification, the joint ventures are still subject to antitrust liability, but treble damages will not be awarded against
84
defendants who have registered under the Act.
3. Prospectsfor Future Legislation. There is a great deal of proposed
joint venture legislation before Congress. 8 5 The most sweeping bill is
H.R. 1604: The National Cooperative Production Amendments of
1991.86 This bill proposes a NCRA type of notification for joint ventures, an elimination of treble damages, and a recovery of attorneys' fees
from frivolous plaintiffs. Furthermore, it precludes the use of per se liability for research and development joint ventures. It judges the legality of
such collaborative efforts "on the basis of reasonableness, taking into ac87
count all relevant factors affecting competition."
(3) not constitute unfair methods of competition against competitors engaged in the export
of goods... exported by the applicant, and
(4) not include any act that may reasonably be expected to result in the sale for consumption or resale within the United States of the goods ... exported by the applicant.
Id. at 5 4013(a).
80. Private parties may still sue if the standards are violated, litigation costs incurred may be
awarded to a successful defendant, and damages are restricted to actual harm incurred. See H.R. REP.
No. 516, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. 3 (1990).
81. 15 U.S.C. 5S 4301-4305 (1988 & Supp. 1991). See also Christopher O.B. Wright, The National Cooperative Research Act of 1984: A New Antitnust Regime for Joint Research and Development
135 (1986).
Ventures, I HIGH TECH. L.J.

82. 15 U.S.C.

5 4302 (1988 & Supp. 1991).

83. 15 U.S.C. SS 4301-4305 (1988 & Supp. 1991). In addition, it should be noted that notification under the NCRA is different from certification under the ETCA.

84. 15 U.S.C.

S4303(a) (1988 & Supp. 1991).

The FTC and the Department of Justice "screen" rather than "adjudicate" the legality of ventures. Thus the protection provided by private suits is not eliminated, as applicants are under certification, and potentially illegal ventures may still be stopped despite agency inaction.
85. See Lindsay, supra note 5, at 1188-98.

86. H.R. 1604, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. (1991).
87. H.R. REP. No. 516, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. 17 (1990) (discussing H.R. 4611, 101st Cong., 2d
Sess. (1990), which is virtually identical in language to H.R. 1604).
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A Case Study: The GM-Toyota Joint Venture

The FTC's assessment of the GM-Toyota joint venture8 8 illustrates a
significant agency approach to production joint ventures. Toyota and
GM, respectively the first and third largest automobile manufacturers in
the world, collaborated to produce a specific subcompact car not previously produced in the United States.8 9 This arrangement was not treated
as an outright merger by the FTC because the agreement called for only a
partial integration of the resources of the two firms.90
Therefore, the FTC considered the arrangement to be a joint venture, after weighing the venture's procompetitive benefits against its anticompetitive burdens. The FTC concluded that prices would decrease
with increased competition in the market for subcompact cars. 91 The
GM-Toyota pricing formula was left intact since it had one considerable
advantage - it decreased the need for the partners to agree on a price for
the joint venture vehicles each year, reducing the need to exchange competitively sensitive information. 92 Moreover, prices were to be fixed
through negotiations between the joint venture and GM. 93 Since the cars
would be sold to GM for distribution through its own dealers, Toyota had
no direct role to play in price determination.
Toyota's recent decision to set up a plant in the United States eliminated any concern that the venture would deter either Toyota or GM
from entering the market alone. Concerned that unlimited production
by the joint venture would discourage GM from innovating their own fuel
efficient automobile, the FTC limited annual production to 250,000 vehicles. 94 The consent order of the Commission severely restricted the kinds
of information the companies could share, thus diminishing the threat of
anticompetitive conduct. 95 The parent companies were not prevented
from competing in the subcompact market against each other as well as
96
against the joint venture.
The venture was approved for a limited period of twelve years. 9 7 The
procompetitive benefits were found to outweigh the anticompetitive con88. General Motors Corp., 103 F.T.C. 374 (1984).
89. Another Turn of the Wheel; Coming Together, THE ECONOMIST, Mar. 2, 1985, at 6.
90. General Motors, 103 F.T.C. at 386.
91. Id. at 386-87.

92. Id. at 387.
93.
94.
95.
96.

Id. at 386.
Id at 383.
See id. at 384.
Id. at 386.

97. Id. at 384. But see id. at 388-97 (two of the five commissioners dissenting).
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cerns in light of the restraints. 98 In addition, the joint venture would
allow GM to produce the car at a lower cost than if it were to rely on
other production sources. An important consideration was that the venture would provide GM and the automobile industry in the United States
an opportunity to learn firsthand from the Japanese system of manufacturing and management. 99
E.

Conclusions

More production joint ventures are likely in the future despite the
fact that the proposed legislation does not substantially restructure the
current law.100 The enhanced role played by the federal agencies has instilled a degree of certainty in the rule of reason analysis. Federal agencies
have adopted standards for prosecution of cooperative ventures and
mergers in addition to employing a system of "business review letters."' 01
Progressive administrative policies will also encourage joint ventures. For
example, on March 14, 1991, the DOJ authorized a joint venture between
the Recording Industry Association of America, Inc. (RIAA) and Bolt,
Beranek and Newman Systems and Technologies Corp. (BNN).1 0 2 These
companies intend to develop new technology to control the unauthorized
duplication of copyrighted work from analog sources (e.g., phonograph
records and prerecorded cassettes) using digital audio tape recorders. 10 3
The Department concluded that it had "no present intention to challenge
04
RIAA's proposed joint venture with BBN."'
98. See id. at 386-87 (finding that the venture would increase the total number of cars available
and allow consumers greater choice).
99. Walter W. Winslow, Joint Ventures - Antitrust Problems and Opportunities, 54 ANrrrRusr LJ.
979, 983 (1985).
100. See supra part II.C.
101. These letters are issued by the Department of Justice and indicate the stance that will be
taken by the agency. Although they are not binding, they are important in reassuring the confidence
of applicants and reduce the risk involved in a proposed venture.
102. Recording Industry Assoc. of America, DOJ Response Letter (Mar. 14, 1991), available in
WESTLAW, FATR-BRL Database.
103. 1i
104. Id. The letter mentions the following considerations:
The joint venture offers the possibility of benefits and efficiencies in undertaking expensive
and risky new product development without any significant diminution of competition in
either the market in which the venture proposes to operate or in other markets where
RIAA members compete or might compete.
.. [The joint venture does not prohibit RIAA members from using or developing
competing technologies or otherwise restrict R&D competition among RIAA members.
Nor does the joint venture foreclose access of RIAA members or other firms to existing
related technology or impose any other collateral restraints.
... [T]he joint venture does not increase the opportunity for collusion in these markets
or otherwise affect the incentives of RIAA members or any other firms to compete.
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M.

DEVELOPMENT OF PRODUCTION JOINT VENTURES IN
THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY
Joint ventures are far more prevalent in Europe than in the United
States.105 This is the direct result of clearer legal standards and a more
favorable attitude toward joint ventures. Indeed, the European Commission (Commission) considers the creation of a joint venture 10 6 to be "an
appropriate response to three related problems: economic recession, the
fragmentation of European industry, and foreign competition." 10 7 This
section briefly highlights the position of joint ventures in the EC and
analyzes the different treatment of production joint ventures under
United States and EC competition laws.
The principles of competition law in the EC were incorporated into
the Community's constitution, the EEC Treaty.10 8 Although influenced
heavily by United States antitrust law and theory,109 the language and
structure of the Treaty's competition provisions reflect different policy
goals. The primary goal of EC competition policy is that of the EEC
Treaty itself - the creation of a European common market. Thus, the
main focus of the competition provisions is on eliminating private practices that interfere with market integration.110
Furthermore, EC competition jurisprudence stresses certain sociopolitical values such as fairness. 11 In contrast, antitrust law in the United
States is concerned primarily with the antimonopolistic economic theory

105. Joint ventures in the European Community have increased dramatically; the number grew
from 82 new joint ventures in 1984 to 156 in 1990. During that time period a total of 649 joint
ventures were established in the European Community. COMMISSION OF THE EURoPEAN COMMUNITIES,
EIrEENTH REPORT ON COMPETITION PoucY 240 (1989); COMMISSION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES,
TWENTETH REPORT ON COMPETITION PoucY 231 (1990).

In comparison, the United States has had fewer joint ventures. Even where the United States
government has begun to encourage joint ventures, its numbers still fall short of those in the EC.
Under the NCRA's notification system, only 130 research and development joint ventures were registered between 1984 and 1990. This relatively low number represented an increase over the previous
few years. Joel B. Eisen, Antitrust Reform for Joint Production Ventures, 30 JuiummIUcs J.OF L., Sci. &
TECH. 253, 256 (1990).

106. The working definition of joint ventures in the EC is similar to that used in the U.S. See
Jonathan Faull, Joint Ventures Under the EEC Competition Rules, 5 EUR.COMPETITION L. REv. 358, 358
(1984).
107. Id. at 359.
108. TREATv ESTABUSHINo THE EURoPEAN ECONOMIC COMMUNITY [EEC TREsATY] arts. 85-86. The

EEC Treaty, also known as the Treaty of Rome, came into force on January 1, 1958.
109. Barry E. Hawk, The American (Anti-Trust) Revolution: Lessons for the EEC?, 9 EUR. COMPEnTION L REv. 53 (1988).

110. Id. at 54-56.
111. Id. at 56-62.
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that underlies the Sherman Act.112 Since the Sherman Act was intended
to combat the power of the trusts, United States law in this area historically has been anticollaborative. 113 As a result, the policy of the EC is
more conducive to the establishment of production joint ventures than
the policy of the United States.
The institutional structure of the EC also has contributed to the differences between competition laws. While antitrust enforcement in the
United States is administered by two federal agencies and many private
plaintiffs, the EC vests most of its enforcement power in one body - the
Commission." 4 Council Regulation 17/62 gives direct effect to the competition principles contained in the EEC Treaty and grants the Commission sweeping regulatory powers." 5 The Regulation permits the
Commission to unilaterally declare the existence of a violation, assess
fines, and impose penalties." 6 Although the European Court of Justice
(ECJ) has the power to review the Commission's decisions," 7 it is removed from direct involvement in the regulatory process." 8
The concentration of regulatory authority in the Commission limits
the involvement of member states in antitrust enforcement. Although
member states adopt European legislation, national courts are restricted
in their interpretation of Community law." 9 In an effort to ensure the
uniform interpretation of Community law, Article 177 of the EEC Treaty
empowers the ECJ to review any issues of Community law which arise in
national courts. 120 In fact, when a dispute reaches the highest appellate
court of a member state, any question pertaining to Community law must
21
be referred to the ECJ.'
112. "[T]he economics component of competition policy in the two systems now differs considerably given the ascendancy of the Chicago school and the general shift in prevailing economic theories

in the United States." Id. at 56.
113. See supra text accompanying notes 12-13.
114. The EEC Treaty establishes the Commission as the basic executive body responsible for
ensuring that the provisions of the EEC Treaty are applied and exercising powers for the implementation of subordinate legislation which the Council of Ministers prescribes. EEC TREATY art. 155.
115. Council Regulation 17/62 of 6 February 1962, First Regulation Implementing Articles 85
and 86 of the Treaty, 1959-1962 O.J. SPEC. ED. 87 [hereinafter Regulation 17/62] came into force on
March 13, 1962.
116. Id. arts. 10(3), 15, 16.
117. EEC TREATY art. 173.

118. It is interesting to note that, although the Department of Justice has prosecutorial discretion
in the U.S., the decision whether a violation has occurred is vested solely with the courts. See supra

text accompanying notes 33-37.
119. See EEC TREATY art. 177.
120. Id.
121. Id Under the provisions of Article 9(1) of Regulation 17/62, only the Commission is given
the power to grant an exemption under Article 85(3). National courts can only rule upon Article
85(1), and any subsequent exemption must be obtained from the Commission. Regulation 17/62,
supra note 115, art. 9(1). But see infra part Im.B.3., for a discussion of the EC rule of reason.
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Enforcement in the EC is further centralized because the legal environment inhibits the incentive for private entities to sue. While member
states and natural or legal persons may file complaints directly with the
Commission, these are usually disposed of through informal negotiation
and recommendation procedures.12 2 Additionally, since a great deal of
power is concentrated in the Commission, private individuals confront
many structural impediments when they pursue litigation. 123 Private Attorneys General are further discouraged because EC legislation does not
allow for treble damages or contingency fees.
A. EC Decision Making and Enforcement
The capacity to enforce competition law comes through the enabling
legislation and not directly from the EEC Treaty. Although Articles 85
and 86 of the EEC Treaty contain the substantive basis for the Community's competition law, they do not contain any provisions for its enforcement. Consequently, implementing legislation was necessary to effectuate
the relatively abstract principles of competition law.12 4 Several years after
the EEC Treaty came into force, Regulation 17/62 was passed to establish
more detailed rules and to provide a procedural machinery to enforce
Articles 85 and 86.125
As discussed earlier, Regulation 17/62 vests the regulation and enforcement of EC competition policy almost exclusively with the Commission, the executive body for the EC which is responsible for carrying out
and enforcing the provisions of the EEC Treaty. 126 Included among the
powers granted to the Commission is the ability to approve exemptions
under Article 85(3).127 Given the broad scope of the prohibitions of Arti
cle 85(1), a large percentage of business undertakings must seek an exemption. The Commission's work load would increase enormously if it
continually had to monitor all the business activities taking place in the
Community. 128 To alleviate the policing burden placed on the Commission, Regulation 17/62 encourages self-reporting by setting up a notification system similar to that contained in the NCRA.12 9 Upon reviewing
122. Regulation 17/62, supra note 115, art. 3.
123. To make an effective application to the Commission, a natural or legal person must claim a
legitimate interest in the subject matter of the complaint. Id.
124. Provided that the Council adopts appropriate regulations and directives to give effect to the
principles set out in the Articles 85 and 86. EEC TREn art. 87(1).
125. See Regulation 17/62, supra note 115.
126. EEC TREATY art. 155. See also supra notes 114-18 and accompanying text.
127. See discussion infra part II.B.2.
128. This has given birth to the "European" version of the rule of reason. See infra part III.B.3.
129. Regulation 17/62, supra note 115, arts. 4-5. While notification is voluntary, an agreement
cannot qualify for an exemption under Article 85(3) if the Commission has not been notified of its
existence. Id. art. 4(1). Once the Commission is notified of an agreement, any activity under its
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the competitive effects of an undertaking, the Commission may reach one
of three decisions. First, if it determines that the agreement falls outside
the jurisdictional reach of Articles 85(1) and 86, it may certify that there
are no grounds for action by granting a negative clearance. 130 Second, if
it determines that the agreement satisfies the four criteria in Article 85(3),
it may grant an exemption. 131 Third, it can find that an infringement of
the Treaty provisions has occurred and levy a fine against the concerned
132
parties.
However, the sheer size and scope of the jurisdiction created by the
EEC Treaty coupled with the magnitude of exemption applications did
not abate the workload of the Commission. The concentration of power
in the Commission, its limited resources, and the complexity of the analysis continued to result in numerous long delays. 133 Two developments
have eased this burden: the EC rule of reason analysis and the block
1 34
exemption.
B.

Joint Ventures Under EC Competition Law

The definition of joint ventures in the EC is similar to that used in
the United States. 135 However, the application of competition law in the
EC generally is more predictable than in the United States. The substantive principles of competition law are contained in Articles 85 and 86 of
the EEC Treaty. Article 85 states that agreements which affect trade between member states and restrict competition are unlawful. Article 86
auspices will not be subject to fines for infringements of Articles 85 and 86 of the Treaty. Id art.
15(5). Subsequently, if the Commission does grant an exemption, it will be retroactive to the date
when the Commission was first notified. Id. art. 6(l). See supra part ll.C.2., for a discussion of the
NCRA.
130. Regulation 17/62, supra note 115, art. 2. See Commission Decision 90/410 of 13 July 1990
on Elopak/Metal Box, 1990 OJ. (L 209) 15.
131. Regulation 17/62, supra note 115, arts. 6, 8. Note that the Commission may issue comfort
letters instead of a formal exemption or negative clearance, by intimating to the applicant that it is
closing the file as it sees no need to take action under the competition laws. See BELLAMY & CHILD,
supra note 26, S 11-005. The effect of this is:
1) The agreement remains notified so the protection from fines continues under Art. 15(5)
of Reg. 17.
2) In contrast to a formal decision of exemption under Art. 85(3), national courts are not
precluded from applying Art. 85(1) to the agreement, but may take account of such a letter
or stay the proceedings pending a formal decision from the Commission.
3) The Commission is bound by the position taken in the comfort letter, unless there has
been a material change of circumstances.
Case 31/80, L'Oreal v. De Nieuwe AMK, 1980 E.C.R. 3775, 3803, 2 C.M.L.R. 235, 246 (1981)
(Advocate General Reischl).
132. Regulation 17/62, supra note 115, arts. 15-16.
133. D.G. GoYDER, EEC COMPETMON LAW 58 (1990).
134. See infra parts ll.B.3.-B.4.
135. See, eg., Faull, supra note 106.
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forbids "[a]ny abuse by one or more undertakings of a dominant posi137
-"136 The same conduct can violate both of these provisions.
tion ..
1. Article 85(1). Article 85 is the main provision concerning collaborative activity within the EC. Paragraph (1) prohibits "all agreements
.. . which have as their.object or effect the prevention, restriction or
distortion of competition within the common market...." 138 The interpretation of this provision is very broad. In fact, the Commission often
finds that a relatively slight limitation on the freedom of the parties
139
amounts to a restriction on competition.
A joint venture may be found to restrict competition under Article
85(1) where the participants are actual or potential competitors. 140 Joint
ventures between actual competitors are likely to infringe upon Article
85(1), because competition between the venture partners clearly is affected. Even those joint ventures formed purely for research and development fall within the prohibition of paragraph (1) because they effectively
eliminate the possibility of one firm gaining a competitive advantage over
4
the other.' '
Conversely, joint ventures formed by potential competitors do not
overtly violate Article 85(1), since no existing competition between the
partners is impaired. Previously, the Commission interpreted the notion
of potential competition very broadly. If each collaborator had the potential 'to produce a certain product, the joint venture was considered to be
prohibited by Article 85(l).147 The Commission, however, changed its
136. EEC T.AaTr art. 86. This concept is similar to that of monopolization in the United States.
137. See Case 85/76, Hoffman-La Roche v. Commission, 1979 E.C.R. 461, 3 C.M.L.R. 211
(1979) (ruling that a company in a dominant position abuses that position when it enters into a
restrictive tying agreement with its purchasers).
138. EEC TREA-rY art. 85(1). Article 85(2) declares all agreements which violate Article 85(1)
"automatically void." Id. art. 85(2).
139. See, eg., Cases 56/64 & 58/64, Establissments Consten S.A. and Grundig-Verkaufs-GmbH.
v. Commission, 1966 E.C.R. 429, 5 C.M.LR. 418 (1966).
According to Article 155 of the Treaty, the Commission has the authority to decide upon the
application of the law, subject to the review of the European Court of Justice under Article 173. EEC
TP.ATY art. 155. In reviewing the application of Article 85(1), the ECJ has similarly applied a very
broad test, maximizing the jurisdiction of the Commission to review undertakings. See Case 56/65,
La Technique Miniere v. Maschinenbau Ulm G.m.b.H., 1966 E.cR. 234, 5 C.M.L.R. 357 (1966).
140. Even if the participants are not actual or potential competitors, the agreement may still be
prohibited by Article 85(1) if the joint venture will likely affect nonparty competitors within the
market. Ivo VAN BAEL & JEAN-FL& ois Baus, CoMp'rmoN LAw oF THE EEC 184-87 (1987).
141. This is where innovation is particularly critical to a firm's competitive ability. See, e.g., Commission Decision 72/41 of 23 December 1971 on Henkel/Colgate Agreement, 1972 J.0. (L 14) 14, 16;
Commission Decision 79/298 of 17 January 1979 on the Agreement Between Beecham Group Limited and Parke, Davis and Company, 1979 O.J. (L 70) 11, 17 (although in both cases the agreements
fell within Article 85(1), Article 85(3) exemptions were granted).
142. Commission Decision 77/160 of 20 January 1977 on Vacuum Interrupters Ltd., 1977 O.J. (L
48) 32 [hereinafter Commission Decision 77/160].
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policy in its Thirteenth Report on Competition Policy. 143 To determine

whether potential competition is likely to be impaired, the Report states
that a realistic approach must be taken and lists four relevant categories of
inquiry:
Input: Does the investment involved substantially exceed each
partner's individual financing capacity? Does each partner have the
necessary know-how and input access?
Production: Is each partner familiar with the process technology?
Does each partner produce inputs for or products derived from the
joint venture's production and does each partner have access to the
necessary production facilities?
Sales: Is there sufficient actual or potential demand to make it feasible for each partner to manufacture alone? Does each partner have
access to the necessary distribution facilities?
Risk: Could each partner bear alone the technical and financial
risks associated with the joint venture's production operations? 144
A guiding principle in this analysis is whether the partners have the capacity to compete independently in the prevailing commercial, financial,
and economic conditions. Market structure, barriers to entry, credit
availability, and terms of the partnership agreement are all relevant to this
145
analysis.
A variation on the concept of potential competition is the network
effect. 146 In Optical Fibres,14 7 the Commission found that different joint
venture agreements in different member states were prohibited by Article
85(1). Because Coming was an active participant in each venture, the
Commission reasoned that the otherwise independent collaborations
were in fact related.
Coming's active participation in the joint ventures cannot be compared with a straightforward financial investment in or licensing of several independent third parties. Firstly, the joint ventures depend fully
on Corning's technology and its implementation by a technical manager appointed by Coming. Secondly, the fact that Coming is a partner in each joint venture creates a network of closely inter-related
companies which are otherwise competitors. Given this network of inter-related and the technological dependence of the joint ventures on a
common partner, they cannot be expected to compete with each other
to the same extent as if they were unrelated1 48competitors relying on different partners and different technologies.
143. COMMISSION OF THE EURoPFAN COMMuNmEs, THIRTEENm REPORT ON COMPE=ON POLICY

(1984).
144. Id. at 51.
145. Fault, supra note 106, at 361.
146. VAN BAEL & BELUS, supra note 140, at 186.
147. Commission Decision 86/405 of 14 July 1986 on Optical Fibres, 1986 O.J. (L 236) 30.

148. Id.at 37.
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In addition to its analysis of the nature of the relationship between
joint venture partners, the Commission will examine the effect of joint
ventures on third parties. Whether third parties are adversely affected
will be a question of fact in each case. Factors that the Commission will
consider include: alterations in the structure of the market making it
more difficult for third parties to compete; 149 cooperation between the
joint venture partners that may reduce their willingness to cooperate with
third parties in the same field; 150 an actual or potential reduction in the
number of suppliers;1 5 ' and other factors that may deter the partners
152
from buying from third parties.
2. Article 85(3). Paragraph (1) of Article 85 essentially is a clause
establishing jurisdictional reach. By prohibiting a broad range of business
undertakings, paragraph (1) maximizes the authority of the Commission
to regulate competition in the member states. Paragraph (3) of Article 85
provides an exception to paragraph (1) by declaring it inapplicable in certain cases. 15 3 Paragraph (3) sets out four separate criteria that must be
met before an exemption from a paragraph (1) prohibition can be
granted. Each deserves an independent analysis.
a. Does the agreement contribute to "improving the production or distribution of goods or to promoting technical or economic progress... "? 154 The parties must show that the agreement does indeed yield progress or
155
improvements which will counter any restrictions on competition.
Moreover, the improvement or progress must not merely benefit the par156
ties themselves, but must have the potential of benefitting third parties.
The interpretation given to these concepts is usually broad and "responsive to many different types of economic progress and technical ad158
vance." 1 57 The decision in GEC/Weir exemplifies this type of inquiry.
In this case, GEC/Weir formed a network of contractual arrangements
for the joint production, development, and sale of sodium circulators.
The parent companies were each allocated primary responsibility for cer149. Eg., Commission Decision 77/160, supra note 142.
150. Commission Decision 77/781 of 23 November 1977 on GEC-Weir Sodium Circulators,
1977 OJ. (L 327) 26 [hereinafter Commission Decision 77/781].
151. Id.
152. Commission Decision 78/921 of 20 October 1978 on WANO Schwarzpulver, 1978 OJ. (L

322) 26.
153. See Commission Decision 90/46 of 12 January 1990 on Alcatel Espace/Ant
Nachrichtentechnik, 1990 O.J. (L 32) 19; Commission Decision of 6 May 1991 on Du Pont/Merck
(not yet published).
154. EEC TRE.ArY art. 85(3).
155. GoYDER, supra note 133, at 118.
156. Id. at 120.
157. Id. at 121.
158. Commission Decision 77/781, supra note 150.
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tain defined areas. Despite the many restrictions on competition in the
agreement, an exemption under Article 85(3) was granted. 159 The Commission found that the parties possessed complementary skills that would
facilitate the development of the product and diminish associated risks. 16°
Furthermore, since neither party was capable of developing the new product alone, the threat to competition was minimal. 161 Both parent companies would acquire expertise in the field, thus enabling them to compete
independently following the termination of the venture. Weir, in particu162
lar, would be a stronger competitive force in the industry.
b. Does the venture allow "consumers a.fair share of the resulting benefit
...
"? 163 The term consumers is interpreted to include a broad category
of people and is not limited to the final purchaser or retailer. This interpretation stems from the use of the expression utilisateurs in the French
text of the EEC Treaty. 164 In keeping with the liberal attitude of the
Commission, benefits include a variety of economic advantages and are
not restricted to reductions in price. The ease with which the Commission is convinced about benefits trickling down to the utilisateurs has led
to the criticism that the analysis does not receive the thoroughness it
165
warrants.
c. Does the agreement "impose on the undertakings concerned restrictions
which are not indispensable to the attainment of these objectives... "? 166 This
is similar to the less restrictive alternative concept under the rule of reason analysis in the United States. 167 The participants must show that the
restrictions imposed by the agreement are tailored strictly to the valid
purposes of the agreement. A well-known case failing this inquiry is Consten Grundig.168 The exclusive dealership agreement that entitled Consten
to distribute Grundig products in France met the first two conditions
above. 169 The trademark however, was misused to exclude parallel imports. The ECJ found that excluding parallel imports was not necessary
159. Id. at 36.

160. Id. at 33.
161. Id.
162. Id.
163. EEC TR.rY art. 85(3).

164. See, e-g., Commission Decision 68/319 of 17 July 1968 on ACEC/Berliet, 1968 J.O. (L 201)
7, 9 [hereinafter Commission Decision 68/319] (upholding an agreement concerning the development and marketing of buses equipped with an electrical transmission system which would eventually
benefit operators of bus companies).
165. See GoYDER, supra note 133, at 121.
166. EEC TP.EAY art. 85(3)(a).

167.
168.
mission,
169.

See supra notes 60-61 and accompanying text.
Cases 56/64 & 58/64, Etablissements Consten S.A. and Grundig-Verkaufs-GmbH v. Com1966 E.C.R. 299, 5 C.M.L.R. 418 (1966).
Id. at 348-350, 5 C.M.L.R. at 477-80.
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for the performance of the agreement and the agreement was struck
0
down.17
d. Does the agreement "afford such undertakingsthe possibility of eliminatin respect of a substantialpart of the products in question"? 171
competition
ing
This sets a limit beyond which considerations of general economic policy
cannot be allowed to prevail over the maintenance of effective competition in the common market. Nonetheless, "[e]xperience suggests.., that
an agreement that clearly satisfies the other criteria in Article 85(3) is
17 2
unlikely to fail under this one."
In spite of the obvious similarities between the two analyses, there is
a fundamental distinction. Courts and agencies in the United States are
empowered to balance all the pro and anticompetitive aspects of the arrangement, and they have extensive flexibility with regard to the factors
they may take into account.17 3 On the other hand, the Commission is
restricted to inquiring into whether the joint venture satisfies all of the
criteria of Article 85(3).174 This is in stark contrast to the overall balancing test under the rule of reason analysis in the United States.
3. The European Rule of Reason. The phraseology of Article 85(1)
supports the creation of a rule of reason in EC competition law. This
Article prohibits all "agreements ... that affect trade between Member
States and have as their object ... the prevention, restriction or distortion of competition within the common market .... ,,175 Given the collaborative nature of joint ventures it is possible that all joint ventures will
need to seek exemptions provided by Article 85(3). This, however, has
not been the case, as the ECJ has developed its own concept of the rule of
reason to define the scope of the term distortion. 7 6 In so doing the ECJ
has both qualified and narrowed the jurisprudential construction of this
term. The ECJ has held that joint venture agreements do not fall within
Article 85(1) if their restrictions on competition are genuinely necessary
to the successful functioning of the venture. 7 7 Under the European anal170. Id. at 346, 5 C.M.LR. at 476.
171.

EEC TREATY art. 85(3)(b).

172. See DERRuCK WYATr & ALAN
173. See supra part Il.B.1.

DASHWOOD, THE SUBSTANTIVE LAW OF THE

EEC 387 (1987).

174. GoYDER, supra note 133, at 116-17.
175. EEC TREATY art. 85(1).

176. See Ernst Steindorff, Article 85 and the Rule of Reason, 21 COMMON MKT. L. REv. 639 (1984).
177. See, eg., Case 16/84, Pronuptia de Paris G.m.b.H. v. Pronuptia de Paris Irmgard Schillgallis,
1986 E.C.R. 353, 1 C.M.L.R. 414 (1986) (finding that while a franchising arrangement which imposed restrictions on the conduct of the franchisees did not, in and of itself, violate Article 85 (1), the
specific agreement in question did violate Article 85 (1) as a result of an exclusive territory clause
coupled with the obligation to sell from only the franchised outlet). An ancillary restraint is the U.S.
equivalent to this concept.
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ysis, a joint venture is compatible with Article 85(1) when its selective
distribution system is based on qualitative nondiscriminatory criteria. 178
The ECJ is most willing to construe a restraint as genuinely necessary
when the restraint encourages innovation. In LC. Nungesser KG & Kurt
Eisele v. Commission,17 9 the French national agricultural institute granted
an exclusive maize seed patent to a dealer in Germany. After complaints
were filed by the dealer's competitors, the Commission initiated proceedings against the defendants, alleging their agreement to be an illegal restraint of trade. The ECJ held that the restraint did not fall within
Article 85(1).180 The Court distinguished between an open exclusive general license, where the licensor refrains from licensing anyone else in that
same territory, and a protected exclusive license, where the parties propose to eliminate all competition from licensees in other territories. The
former encouraged technical innovation and was held to be lawful; however, the latter was found to be per se unlawful. 18 1
The European rule of reason is a narrow inquiry developed mainly to
relieve the excessive burden imposed on the ECJ and the Commission. It
enables national courts to play a role in antitrust enforcement by concluding that a particular agreement does not fall within Article 85(1).
Although national courts still have no power to grant an exemption
under Article 85(3), their ability to use the rule of reason often eliminates
the need for a joint venture agreement to seek an exemption under
85(3).182

4. Block Exemptions. To expedite the applications for Article 85(3)
exemptions, the Commission has issued several regulations granting block
exemptions to certain types of agreements that the Commission finds desirable. 18 3 Block exemptions are issued for categories ranging from exclusive distribution agreements' 84 to franchise agreements.1 85 Generally, the
178. See Case 26/76, Metro v. Commission, 1977 E.C.R. 1875, 1905, 2 C.M.LR. 1, 36 (1978).
179. Case 258/78, LC. Nungesser KG & Kurt Eisele v. Commission, 1982 E.C.R. 2015, 1
C.M.L.R. 278 (1983).
180. Id. at 2070, 1 C.M.L.R. at 354.
181. Id. at 2068-69, 1 C.M.L.R. at 352-53. The ECJ held "the grant of an open exclusive license,
that is to say that a license which does not affect the position of third parties such as parallel importers and licensees from other territories, is not in itself incompatible with Art. 85(1) of the Treaty." Id.
at 2069, 1 C.M.L.R. at 353.
182. GoYDER, supra note 133, at 348.
183. Power to enact these regulations is vested in the Commission by Council Regulation 19/65
of 2 March 1965 on Certain Categories of Agreements and Concerted Practices, 1965-1966 O.J. SPEc.
ED. 35; Council Regulation 2821/71 of 20 December 1971 on Categories of Agreements, Decisions,
and Concerted Practices, 1971 III O.J. SPEC. ED. 1032.
184. Commission Regulation 1983/83 of 22 June 1983 on Categories of Exclusive Distribution
Agreements, 1983 O.J. (L 173) 1.
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exemptions are of limited duration.18 6 The possible block exemptions for
production joint ventures are classified in Regulations 417/85 and 418/
85;187 they came into force on March 1, 1985, and are valid until December 31, 1997. The broad policy underlying both regulations is to grant
block exemptions to specialization and research and development agreements on terms that are fairly generous. The exemptions, however, are
subject to specified thresholds designed to prevent excessive elimination
1 88
of competition.
Article 1 of Regulation 41-7/85 provides that the block exemption
covers:
[Aigreements on specialization whereby, for the duration of the agreement undertakings accept reciprocal obligations: (a) not to manufacture
certain products or have them manufactured, but to leave it to other
parties to manufacture the products or have them manufactured; or (b)
to manufacture certain products or have them manufactured only
jointly.89

Article 3(a) of this Regulation restricts its availability to agreements where
the combined market share represented by the specialization and other
similar products of the participating undertakings does not exceed 20 percent in the Community or a substantial part of it. 190 Article 3(b) restricts
the availability of the block exemption to those cases where the aggregate
annual turnover of participating companies does not exceed ECU 500
million. 9 1 Turnover is calculated by reference to total turnover in all
goods and services in the preceding financial year, excluding tax and sales
between participating undertakings.' 92 Further, the Regulation expressly
limits the types of restrictions on competition that agreements seeking
exemptions can use. 193 The list of permissible restrictions on competition
is not exhaustive, so other restrictions that do not offend Article 85(1)
185. Commission Regulation 4087/88 of 30 November 1988 on Categories of Franchise Agreements, 1988 O.J. (L 359) 46.
186. WYATr & DASHWOOD, supra note 172, at 387-88.
187. Commission Regulation 417/85 of 19 December 1984 on Categories of Specialization
Agreements, 1985 O.J. (L 53) 1 [hereinafter Commission Regulation 417/85]; Commission Regulation 418/85 of 19 December 1984 on Categories of Research and Development Agreements, 1985
O.J. (L 53) 5 [hereinafter Commission Regulation 418/85].
188. WYATT & DAsHlWooD, supra note 172, at 393.
189. Commission Regulation 417/85, supra note 187, art. 1.
190. Id. art. 3. What is a "substantial part" is a question of fact in each case, dependent on the
geographic area in which the dominant position is alleged to exist and the product market in that
area. See Beiu.sY & CHm, supra note 26, S 8-037.
191. Commission Regulation 417/85, supra note 187, art. 3(b). 1 ECU = $1.27 (appx.), WALL
ST. J., Jan. 31, 1992, at C17.
192. Commission Regulation 417/85, supra note 187, art. 6.
193. Id. art. 2.

Winter 1992]

PRODUCTION JOINT VENTURES

may be included without prejudicing the availability of a block
1 94
exemption.
An agreement can be exempted automatically if the Commission
does not oppose it within six months after receipt of official notification
by the parties.1 95 This is so even if the turnover limits laid down in Article 3 are ekceeded. 19 6 The other conditions of the Regulation, however,
must be met. This procedure is probably beneficial to parties who form a
part of a larger group, but do not have a strong position in the relevant
market. 197 Regulation 418/85 applies to agreements for the purposes of:
(a) joint research and development of products or processes and joint
exploitation of the results of that research and development;
(b) joint exploitation of the results of research and development of
products or processes jointly carried out pursuant to a prior agreement
between the same undertakings; or
(c) joint research and development of products or processes excluding
joint exploitation of the results,
insofar as such agreements fall within
1

the scope of Article 85(1). 98

Article 3(2) of this Regulation provides that an exemption will not be
available to those firms whose combined shares do not exceed twenty percent of the market for such products or a substantial part of it. 199 The
Regulation also lists provisions that must be included in the agreement,
those that may be included in the agreement, and those that are forbidden.2°° If the agreement complies with Articles 2 and 3 of the regulation,
but contains restrictive clauses not covered by Articles 4, 5, and 6, parties
may notify the Commission of the agreement, which will be treated as an
exempted transaction unless the Commission formally opposes the ex20
emption within six months of notification. '
C. The GM-Toyota Case Study in Europe
The attitude of the Commission toward joint ventures is well expressed in their Draft Guidelines:
[iJoint ventures normally contribute substantially to improving the production and distribution of goods, promote technical and economic
progress, serve the interest of consumers and by that contribute to the
attainment of the Community's general economic objectives.... This is
particularly the case where the joint venture by means of rationaliza194. See BEuAMY & CHILD, supra note 26, S 5-061.
195. Commission Regulation 417/85, supra note 187, art. 4(1).
196. Id.
197. BEL.AmY & CHILD, supra note 26, 5 5-063.
198. Commission Regulation 418/85, supra note 187, art. 1 (the Regulation does not apply to
agreements concerning joint sales).
199. Id. art. 3(2).
200. Id. arts. 2, 4-6.
201. See BELLAmY & CHILD, supra note 26, S 5-027.
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tion, introduction of new improved products or processes or the opening up of new markets, serves as an instrument of innovative
competition in a structurally competitive market. In general, the Commission will 2take
a favorable view of joint ventures involving major new
02
investment.
Analyzing a United States case under EC law is a helpful way to
highlight the differences between the two antitrust systems. The GMToyota joint venture is well-suited for such an experiment. The reasons
for selecting this case are twofold: it is a decision by a federal agency,
making it more suitable for comparison with decisions by the European
Commission, and it is a very comprehensive examination of a production
joint venture by United States courts.
1. An Analysis Based on Article 85(3). Since GM and Toyota are
actual competitors, each with large market shares, it is assumed that the
GM-Toyota venture would fall within the general prohibitions of Article
85(1).203 It is also assumed that it would not qualify under Regulations
417/85 and 418/85, since the aggregate turnover of the undertakings
would definitely exceed the ECU 500 million limit. 20 4 Therefore, an anal20 5
ysis under Article 85(3) is required.
a. Does the agreementcontribute "to improving the production or distribu.
tion of goods or to promoting technical or economic progress... "? 206 The Commission "attaches significant weight to the fact that a joint venture may
be the means, either immediately or in the long run, of bringing about an
improvement in the competitive structure." 20 7 The Chairman of the
FTC specifically acknowledged that the GM-Toyota joint venture would
produce such a result. In its consent order, the Chairman recognized that
to the extent that "the Japanese system can be successfully adapted to the
United States, the venture should lead to the development of a more effi20 8
cient and competitive U.S. industry."
The Commission will also provide exemptions for joint ventures,
even between large companies, where it is satisfied that the venture enables the parties to overcome technical difficulties and financial risks asso202. Commission of the European Communities, Principles Governing the Assessment of Joint
Ventures Under the Competition Rules, Doc. IV/471/85 - EN 7 [hereinafter Draft Guidelines].
203. See supra part I.B.1. See also supra part ll.D., for the facts of the GM - Toyota joint
venture.
204. See supra note 191 and accompanying text.
205. The relevant market is assumed to be that for subcompact cars within the European
Community.

206. EEC TREATY art. 85(3).
207. BEuAmY & CHILD, supra, note 26, S5-076. See also Commission Decision 77/781, supra note
150.
208. General Motors Corp., 103 F.T.C. 374, 388 (1984).
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ciated with the development of advanced technological products. 20 9 The
GM-Toyota venture was established to produce a subcompact vehicle
which previously had never been produced in the United States. 2 10 By
pooling complementary technology and resources, the venture partners
21 1
intended to develop a new product at a lower cost.
The Commission, in Continental/Michelin,upheld a similar joint ven212
ture formed to develop a new run-flat tire system for passenger cars.
This joint venture consisted of an agreement to develop a new model of
2 13
tire between the first and second largest tire manufacturers in the EC.
Patents and expertise were to be exploited jointly through a common entity in which each party would hold an equal interest and licenses would
be given to all interested competitors on reasonable terms. 21 4 In deliberating whether an Article 85(3) exemption would be granted to the Continental/Michelin joint venture, the Commission was not deterred by the
large size of the undertaking.2 15 The Commission was convinced that
Continental would be unable to develop the product in a reasonable period depending solely on its own resources.2 1 6 The Commission thus is
not likely to look with disdain upon a joint venture solely because the
agreeing parties (GM-Toyota) are the first and third largest producers of
2 17
automobiles in the world.
b. Does the venture allow "consumers a fair share of the resulting benefit
).218 It cannot be disputed that the utilisateurs would share in the
resulting benefit;21 9 there would be more subcompact cars available in the
market. Additionally, both manufacturers will have learned from their
cooperative experience, thus making the market more competitive. It is,
thus, unlikely that the Commission will find that the consumers would
not get a fair share of the resultant benefit from the GM-Toyota venture,
especially considering the finding of the FTC Chairman that the GMToyota joint venture would "increase the total number of small cars avail209. COMMISSION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMuNmEs, SEVENTH REPORT ON COMPETION Poucy,
point 150 (1978).
210. General Motors Corp., 103 F.T.C. at 376.
211. See Andrew Pollack, Japan Technology Monitored by Worried U.S. Competitors, N.Y. TIMES,
May 7, 1984, at Al.
212. Commission Decision 88/555 of 11 October 1988 on Continental/Michelin, 1988 O.J. (L
305) 33 [hereinafter Commission Decision 88/555].
213. Id. at 34.
214. Id. at 35.
215. Id. at 39 (relying on Commission Decision 72/41 of 23 December 1971 on the Henkel/
Colgate Agreement, 1972 O.J. (L 14) 14, stating that joint research is permissible even between parties having large market shares).
216. Commission Decision 88/555, supra note 212, at 39.
217. See supra note 89 and accompanying text.
218. EEC TR.Ary art. 85(3).
219. See supra note 164 and accompanying text.
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able in America, thus allowing consumers a greater choice at lower
prices ... "220
c. Does the agreement "impose on the undertakings concerned restrictions
which are not indispensable to the attainment of these objectives... "?221 The
inquiry undertaken here is essentially the same as the less restrictive alternative inquiry made by the United States courts.222 This analysis requires
that the individual restrictions be "tailored strictly to the valid purposes
of the agreement... ,"223 According to the Chairman of the FTC, the
purposes of the GM-Toyota venture are threefold: to increase production; to decrease costs; and to exchange technology, know-how, and expertise.2 2 4 The parties attempted to tailor their agreement to achieve
these objectives. So that the anticompetitive effect of the arrangement
would not "spill over" 22 5 into the market as a whole, the venture was
22 6
expressly limited to the production of a specific model of automobile.
Furthermore, the parties were to remain free to compete against one an22 7
other, as well as against the joint venture.
In the Rockwell/Iveco 228 production joint venture, the Commission
granted an exemption reasoning that the agreement led to the emergence
of a new and more efficient competitor, the rationalization of production
capacity, and better use of new technology. 22 9 The two joint venture partners were the largest truck rear drive axle manufacturer in the United
States, which had a presence in the EC, and the second largest truck
manufacturer in the EC; Rockwell was unable to afford to set up a manufacturing facility on its own.2 30 A more modest solution was not suffi2 31
cient, and the production joint venture was deemed indispensable.
While on its face, the terms of the GM-Toyota agreement appear
narrowly tailored to the joint production of the subcompact, several
troubling issues remain. The Chairman of the FTC chose to deal with
220. General Motors Corp., 103 F.T.C. at 387.
221. EEC TREAry art. 85(3)(a).
222. See supra notes 60-61 and accompanying text.
223. GoYDER,supra note 133, at 122.
224. General Motors Corp., 103 F.T.C. at 389.
225. GoYDER, supra note 133, at 122.
226. General Motors Corp., 103 F.T.C at 376 (Toyota Motor Corporation - General Motors
Corporation Memorandum of Understanding, Feb. 17, 1983) ("The JV would be limited in scope to
this vehicle and this agreement is not intended to establish a cooperative relationship between the
parties in any other business.").
227. Id. at 386.
228. Commission Decision 83/390 of 13 July 1983 on Rockwell/lveco, 1983 O.J. (L 224) 19, 24.
229. Id. at 25.
230. Id. at 19-21.
231. Id. at 26. Joint distribution was justified by the high cost of opening up a market for third
party axle supply to compete with the established system of in-house axle manufacture in the European automobile industry. Id.
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these issues by further narrowing the agreement; the annual production
of the subcompact was limited to 250,000 units, the time frame for the
collaborative effort was limited to twelve years, and certain information
transfers were precluded. 232 It is foreseeable that the European Commission might also tailor the agreement with respect to marketing, exchange
of information, price setting and duration, to ensure that the venture
would not have anticompetitive repercussions.
There is some criticism about the quality of this third inquiry as
made in context of the GM-Toyota joint venture - notably, why the
same benefit could not be derived from GM collaborating with a smaller
Japanese manufacturer. 233 This objection may be dismissed if one accepts
that the best results in any joint venture can only be derived by combining the most efficient manufacturers in the business. The Commission
did not seem too concerned about this potentially controversial view in
the Continental/Michelin venture. Assuming that this line of reasoning
would find favor with the Commission, the venture should not stumble
on this inquiry.
d. Does the agreement "afford such undertakings the possibility of eliminat234
ing competition in respect of a substantialpart of the products in question"?
As discussed above, this is the least problematic of the requirements. 235
In Synthetic Fibres, the Commission granted an exemption to a crisis cartel
set up to reduce the structural overcapacity in the sector.236 The nine
largest European manufacturers of synthetic fiber agreed to reduce their
production capacity for six types of synthetic textile by thirteen percent.2 37 This was done in order to bring supply and demand back into
balance. Here the agreement was exempted because the coordinated capacity reductions involved only one element of the signatories competitive strategies and the signatories had strong competition from non-EC
suppliers. 238 Consequently, there was no danger of the signatories eliminating significant competition. 239 It is most unlikely that the GM-Toyota
venture would fail this test, especially since the venture is introducing an
additional competitor in the market.

232. General Motors Corp., 103 F.T.C at 374.
233. Joseph F. Brodley, The Economic Goals of Antitrust: Efficiency, Consumer Welfare and Technological Progress, 62 N.Y.U. L REv. 1020, 1029 (1987).
234. EEC TREATY art. 85(3)(b).

235.
236.
237.
238.
239.

See supra part lI.B.2.d.
Commission Decision 84/380 of 4 July 1984 on Synthetic Fibres, 1984 OJ. (L 207) 17.
Id. at 18.
Id. at 24.
Id.
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2. Some Conclusions Under 85(3). While it appears that the GMToyota joint venture would improve the production and/or distribution
of subcompact cars in the EC, it is not immediately clear that the Commission would grant an exemption under Article 85(3). First, both venture partners control a large market share and thus the venture would
necessarily be subject to close scrutiny by the Commission.24 0 Second, it
is not clear that GM lacks either the technology or resources to develop a
subcompact on its own.
However, given the limited restrictions on competition imposed by
the venture and the liberal attitude of the Commission, it is more probable than not that the Commission would grant an Article 85(3) exemption. Despite the fact that Article 85(3) requires a four step analysis, the
Commission places special significance on the first and third inquiries.2 4 1
An official of the Commission, in interpreting these two primary stages of
the analysis, listed key factors which, if present, would justify the granting
of an exemption under Article 85(3).242 The GM-Toyota joint venture
agreement comports with several of these standards.
According to this official, a joint venture that is tailored to the "exploitation of complementary technology, know-how, and expertise" and
enables the parties to "overcom[e] technical difficulties, including previous failures by one party" will be looked upon favorably by the Commission.243 The Chairman of the FTC specifically recognized that the GMToyota joint venture "offers a valuable opportunity for GM to complete
its learning of more efficient Japanese manufacturing and management
244
techniques."
IV.

CONCLUSION

The EC invites joint ventures to charge their economic markets
while the United States clings to historic and stale notions of antitrust
law. Because the European system is more centralized and less uncertain,
it is more nurturing to joint ventures. In addition, European industry is
not stifled by the threats of Private Attorneys General and treble damages. As a result, European industry enjoys a certain confidence that
industry in the United States lacks, and joint ventures are more commonplace. By codifying the modem rule of reason standard and dispensing
with private enforcement, the United States Congress can instill new con240. See, eg., Commission Decision 78/921 of 20 October 1978 on WANO Schwarzpulver, 1978
O.J. (L 322) 26.
241. GoYDER, supra note 133, at 183.
242. Faull, supra note 106, at 364.
243. Id.
244. General Motors Corp., 103 F.T.C. at 387-88.
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fidence in the domestic business community and encourage the formation
of joint ventures. The United States might then be more fertile ground
for the establishment and development of production joint ventures.
Suhail Nathani

